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NOTES AND COMMENTS
CUMULATIVE VOTING FOR CORPORATE DIRECTORS
The business boom which stemmed from World War II brought in its
wake an increasing number of proxy battles fought over issues concerning
corporate control. Of the literally hundreds of such contests waged in the
past few years, general interest quite naturally has tended to focus on
those involving the so-called "giants" as, for example, the successful effort
of Robert Young and his associates to obtain control of the New York
Central Railroad and the partly successful attempt by the Louis Wolfson
group to take over management of Montgomery Ward & Company.
Whether these contests have concerned some "giant" or a corporation of
lesser dimensions, almost all of them have involved the process of cumula-
tive voting so it may come as something of a surprise to be reminded that
the principle of cumulative voting, one which has received almost universal
acceptance in the field of private corporation law in the United States,
was originally promulgated as a means by which some representation for
minority groups might be obtained in legislative bodies.
Up to the time of the adoption of the Illinois Constitution of 1870, no
state had enacted a law providing for cumulative voting but in that year
the revised Illinois Constitution included provisions for cumulative voting
both with respect to the election of members of the House of Representa-
tives of the General Assembly and in connection with the choice of direc-
tors by the shareholders of private business corporations.' A perusal of
the record of the constitutional convention which served to frame that
constitution will reveal that the burning issue, at least so far as the
principle of cumulative voting was concerned, was one as to use thereof in
the matter of public elections with its corporate aspects being regarded as
a matter of secondary importance. Following the adoption of that con-
stitution, editorial writers predicted that other states would soon adopt the
device of cumulative voting for use in certain of their public elections but
it is one of the vagaries of history that, despite these enthusiastic predic-
tions, no other state has seen fit to adopt cumulative voting or anything
similar thereto in the selection of its legislative body2 but, as stated before,
the principle has been widely accepted in the government of private cor-
porations. In that area, thirteen states have made cumulative voting
1Iii. Const. 170, Art. IV, §§ 7-8, and Art. XI, § 3.
2 Campbell, "The Origin and Growth of Cumulative Voting for Directors," The
Business Lawyer, Vol. X, p. 3 (April, 1955), particularly pp. 6-7.
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mandatory both by constitution and statute and eight others have made
it mandatory by statute only.4 By contrast, cumulative voting is permitted
by the statutes of eighteen states5 while only nine states have no express
provision regarding it.6
Cumulative voting for corporate directors, of course, is a device to
enable minority stockholders to achieve a degree of representation in cor-
porate management in those situations where the minority would have no
voice whatever in the event strict application to the rule of majority con-
trol were to apply. It cannot be stressed too strongly that cumulative
voting does not guarantee that minority stockholders will achieve repre-
sentation but it does afford a method by which a minority could obtain
representation provided it possessed sufficient voting strength. Under it,
a stockholder is entitled to multiply the number of his shares of stock by
the number of directors to be elected and to vote the total so achieved for
one or more of the candidates. If that total, either alone or when joined
with similar totals by other stockholders, is sufficient to elect a director,
the stockholder or the group of stockholders get representation; otherwise
not.
3 Ariz. Const. 1912, Art. 14, § 10, and Ariz. Code Ann. 1939, § 53-210; Ida. Const.
1890, Art. 11, § 4, and Ida. Code Ann. 1947, §§ 30-134 and 30-140; Ill. Const. 1870,
Art. XI, § 3, and Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 32, § 157.28; Ky. Const. 1891, § 207,
and Ky. Rev. Stat. 1953, § 271.315; Miss. Const. 1890, Art. VII, § 194, and Miss.
Code Ann. 1942, Tit. 21, Ch. 4, § 5326; Mo. Const. 1945, Art. 11, § 6, and Vernon's
Mo. Stat. Ann. 1949, Tit. 23, § 351.245; Mont. Const. 1889, Art. XV, § 4, and Mont.
Rev. Code 1947, § 15-405; Neb. Const. 1875, Art. 12, § 5, and Neb. Rev. Stat. 1943,
§ 21-135; N. D. Const. 1889, Art. VII, § 135, and N. D. Rev. Code 1943, § 10-0510;
Pa. Const. 1874, Art. 16, § 4; S. C. Const. 1895, Art. 9, § 11, and S. C. Code 1952,
§ 12-253; S. D. Const. 1889, Art. XVII, § 5, but note the absence of any specific
statute on the subject; W. Va. Const. 1872, Art. XI, § 4, and W. Va. Code Ann. 1949,
§ 3078.
4 Ark. Stat. Ann. 1947, § 64,224; Deering Cal. Code Ann., Corporation Code, § 2235:
Kas. Gen. Stat. Ann. 1949, § 17-3303; Mich. Stat. Ann. 1937, § 21.32; Minn. Stat.
Ann. 1945, § 300.24; Page Ohio Gen. Code, § 8623-50; Wash. Rev. Code 1951, Tit. 23,
§ 23.32.070; Wyo. Comp. Stat. Ann. 1945, § 44-109. The Minnesota statute specifies
that there shall be cumulative voting unless the articles of incorporation provide
otherwise. California, at one time, had both a constitutional provision and a statute
on the point. Although the constitutional provision was eliminated in 1930, the
statute was retained.
5 Colo. Rev. Stat. 1953, § 31-2-4; Dela. Code Ann. 1953, Tit. 8, § 214; Fla. Stat.
Ann. 1941, § 612.28; Burns Ind. Stat. Ann., § 25-207; West La. Rev. Stat., § 1232;
Flack Md. Code Ann. 1951, Art. 23, § 39; Nev. Comp. Laws 1929, § 1715; N. H. Rev.
Laws 1942, Ch. 274, § 84; N. J. Stat. Ann. 1939, § 14:10-15; N. M. Stat. Ann. 1953,
§ 51-6-6; N. Y. Stock Corporation Law, §§ 49 and 55; N. C. Gen. Stat. 1949, § 55-110:
0kla. Stat. Ann. (perm. ed.), Tit. 18, § 1.68(c) ; Ore. Rev. Stat. 1953, § 57.170(4);
R. I. Gen. Laws 1938, Ch. 116, § 23; Williams Tenn. Code Ann. 1934, § 3741; Vt.
Stat. 1947, Tit. 26, § 5784; Va. Code 1950, § 13-203.
6 The statutes of Alabama, Connecticut, Georgia, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts,
Texas, Utah and Wisconsin are silent on the point. It should be noted, however,
that corporation statutes often allow the incorporators or shareholders to insert in
the charter "any provision not inconsistent with law, which they may choose to
insert for the regulation of the internal affairs of the corporation," or authorize the
charter "to define the rights of stockholders respecting voting." It is possible,
therefore, that cumulative voting might exist In these states.
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The formula for determining the percentage of the total number of
shares required to elect a single director, in the event cumulative voting is
used, may be stated as follows:
1007
Y - + I share
N+I
using Y as the required percentage of stock and N as the number of
directors to be elected. Thus, if three directors are to be elected, 25% of
the total number of shares voted plus one share would be required to elect
a single director. If four directors are to be elected, 20% plus one share
would be needed, and so on. The foregoing formula makes the degree of
representation, if any, which a stockholder or group of stockholders could
obtain on a board of directors by the use of cumulative voting depend
upon the interaction of three variables, to-wit: (a) the percentage of
stock owned; (b) the number of directors to be elected; and (c) whether
or not the number of directors to be elected is odd or even.
Applying these three variables to the facts of any particular case
may produce either no representation or a greater or lesser representation
than the proportion of stock owned. For example, assume A owns 41
shares and B owns 59 shares, representing all of the outstanding corporate
stock entitled to vote7 and there are three directors to be elected. A can,
by the use of cumulative voting, elect one of the three and thereby secure
one-third of the representation.8  In the event four directors were to be
elected, A could, by cumulative voting, elect two of the four and thereby
secure equality of representation on the board of directors, thereby forcing
B, who owns more than a simple majority of the stock of the corporation,
to share control with him.9 In case five directors were to be elected,
A could, by cumulative voting, elect two of the five and secure the equiva-
lent of a 40% representation on the board. 10  Thus, with the same amount
of stock ownership, the degree of representation possible could vary all
7 Under Ill. Const. 1870, Art. XI, § 3, and Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 32,
§ 157.28, all outstanding shares must possess the right to vote.
8 A can cast 41 x 3 or 123 votes; B can cast 59 x 3 or 177 votes. B could mark a
ballot of 89 votes for one candidate and have 88 votes left over for a second.
A's 123 votes would be sufficient to elect the third candidate but, no matter how
divided, would be insufficient to elect two.
9 A is entitled to cast 41 x 4 or 164 votes; B can cast 59 x 4 or 236 votes. A
could cast 82 votes for each of candidates C and D; B could cast 79 votes for each
of candidates E and F, and give the remaining votes to candidate G. On this basis,
A would elect C and D as directors and B would elect only E and F, since the
78 votes for G would be inadequate.
10 A can cast 41 x 5 or 205 votes; B can cast 59 x 5 or 295 votes. If A voted 103
votes for candidate C and 102 votes for candidate D, leaving it to B to cast 99 votes
for his candidate E and 98 votes each for F and G, stockholder A would elect
C and D as directors with B succeeding as to the other three.
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the way from one-third to an equal voice with the majority, depending on
how the mathematics of the other two variables work out.
In much the same way, the percentage of stock ownership required to
elect even one director would vary with the number of directors to be
elected. A stockholder or group of stockholders owning as much as 25%
of the stock of the corporation could not, even under cumulative voting,
elect a single director if only three directors were to be elected, whereas
an interest consisting of 10% plus one share could, by cumulative voting,
elect one director in the event nine directors were to be elected. It is
apparent, therefore, that cumulative voting does not have the effect of
providing exact proportional representation on the board of directors for
the minority stockholder or for a minority group of stockholders.
From what has been said, the importance of the recent decision of the
Illinois Supreme Court in the case of Wolfson v. Avery" should be ap-
parent. The issue in that case was one as to whether or not Section 35 of
the Illinois Business Corporation Act,12 a provision which purported to
permit the classification of a board of directors into two or three classes
where there were at least nine places on the board and for the election of
board members on a staggered basis for terms of two or three years, de-
pendent upon the number of classes, was valid when tested by the consti-
tutional guaranty given to stockholders to cumulate their votes at elections
for corporate directors.1 3 The Supreme Court, applying familiar rules of
construction to the somewhat ambiguous wording of the constitutional
provision, held that the statute was unconstitutional and that it was
imperative, for the protection of minority groups, that all directors be
elected at one and the same time. By reason of this holding, the Wolfson
group was able to allocate its votes proportionately among the full nine
members of the Montgomery Ward board, instead of among the three
members originally scheduled to be elected, and by proper cumulation gain
a degree of representation.
To highlight the importance of this decision for a minority group
seeking representation on a board, a recapitulation of some of the cumula-
tive voting principles already explained would seem to be in order. In an
election to chose no more than three members of a nine-member board,
approximately 250% as many votes would be required to elect a single
director as would be necessary if all nine members were candidates at the
same time. In case all nine members were to be elected at once, a
116 Ill. (2d) 78, 126 N. E. (2d) 701 (1955). Hershey, J., wrote a dissenting
opinion. Compare the holding therein with the action taken by the Ohio Court of
Appeals In Humphrys v. Wvinons Co., - Ohio App. -, 125 N. E. (2d) 204 (1955).
12 I1. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 32, § 157.35.
13 Il. Const. 1870, Art. XI, § 3.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
minority holding 49% of the stock could elect four, and the majority,
holding 51% of the shares and cumulating their votes in the most ad-
vantageous manner, could elect no more than five. If, however, only three
members of the board were to be elected each year, the holders of 49%
would be able to elect only one director at each election and could never
have more than three directors on the board at any one time. Likewise,
holders of 25% of the stock could elect two directors if all nine were
chosen at once but would be unable to elect even one director if the terms
were staggered and only three were to be chosen at each annual meeting.
Clearly, then, the decision in the Wolfson case has opened the door in
Illinois for a degree of minority representation on boards which, hereto-
fore, have been almost impregnable against minority attack.
Just what action, if any, will be taken by those Illinois corporations
affected by the decision cannot be foreseen at this time. One possibility
would be to provide for reincorporation in a jurisdiction which permitted
the use of classified boards of directors with the election of directors on a
staggered-term basis. Although some thirty-five jurisdictions now ex-
pressly permit classification of directors with staggered terms, only a rel-
atively small handful of corporations have seen fit to classify their boards.
Out of a total of 1655 domestic corporations whose stocks are listed on the
New York Stock Exchange, the American Stock Exchange and the Midwest
Stock Exchange, only 196 have classified directors.14 This figure may be
indicative of the doubt as to the constitutionality of such arrangements
when faced with the cumulative voting principle, so reincorporation may
not be a solution for those seeking to retain themselves in positions of
power.
Another obvious step to prevent a minority from gaining representa-
tion would be to reduce the total number of directors on the board. As
the Illinois Business Corporation Act requires that a local corporation
have a minimum of three directors on the board, 5 the size of the board
could not be reduced below that figure but the statute does permit of an
increase or decrease in the composition of the board by an amendment to
the by-laws. Since the right to make, alter, amend, or repeal the by-laws
is vested in the board of directors, unless reserved to the stockholders in
the articles on incorporation,16 it would be possible for a majority bloc of
14 Of this number, 15 are Illinois corporations which can no longer be considered
In the total and must act to elect a complete board at the next election. While the
number appears to be small, the importance of these corporations must not be
overlooked for, at the end of 1954, the market value of the listed securities of the
corporations possessing classified boards of directors totalled $24,755,463,500. See
also Scott, "Developments in Corporate Law," The Business Lawyer, Vol. x, pp.
25-37 (July, 1955), particularly pp. 25-7.
15 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 32, § 157.34.
16 Ibid., Ch. 32, § 157.25.
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directors, the charter and by-laws permitting, to reduce the number of
directors and thereby force an increase in the percentage of shares re-
quired to be held by the minority if that group is to gain a degree of
representation.
17
As long as the present Illinois constitutional provision in favor of
cumulative voting remains, however, there is little that corporate manage-
ment can do to preserve its hold other than to perform its duties fairly,
wisely, and with profit, thereby assuring ample stockholder support against
unjustified attacks by ambitious minority groups.
J. T. RIrCHIE.
PRESS PARTICIPATION IN CRIMINAL TRIALS
There was some occasion to believe that, with the adoption of the sev-
eral canons of ethics relating to the proper conduct of trials,' the day of
the circus atmosphere in the courtroom, a condition which reached its
most disgusting spectacular level in the "terrible 'thirties," 2 had come
to an end, with sound judicial decorum prevailing over the clamor of the
newspaper press for the utmost of freedom in the conduct of its activities.
The press has not been silent at the curbs placed around it but it was not
until recently that journalistic efforts to override judicial orders entered
in connection with the conduct of criminal cases have provided the courts
of two American jurisdictions with further opportunities to determine the
length to which the working members of the press may go in asserting a
right to be present in the courtroom, and to portray the courtroom scene,
in the interest of full newspaper coverage of such trials.
The New York case of United Press Association v. Valenti,3 one
17 In effect, assuming a provision for cumulative voting and a statutory require-
ment for a minimum of at least three directors on the board, the only minority
which would have an absolute guarantee of representation would be one which
could vote one share more than one-fourth of all the shares voted.
1 See, in particular, Canon 35 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics of the American
Bar Association. Note also Canons 1. 15, 18, 20 and 22 of the Canons of Professional
Ethics promulgated by the same body.
2 The opinion of the court in the case of State v. Hauptmann. 115 N. J. L. 412,
180 A. 809 (1935), gives only a pallid account of the courtroom scene in the Lind-
bergh kidnapping case. Busch, They Escaped the Hangman (The Bobbs-Merril Co.,
Indianapolis, 1953), discussing the Hall-Mills case, notes at p. 182 that "nearly half"
of the public gallery space was "pre-empted by representatives of the press." Other
instances could be called to mind, but the record is too shameful to bear repetition.
A dispassionate discussion appears in Holtzoff, "The Relation Between the Right to
a Fair Trial and the Right of Freedom of the Press," 1 Syracuse L. Rev. 369 (1950)?
and a note in 3 Syracuse L. Rev. 150-7.
3308 N. Y. 71, 123 N. E. (2d) 777 (1954), affirming 281 App. Div. 395, 120 N. Y. S.
(2d) 174 (1953), which in turn affirmed 203 Misc. 220, 120 N. Y. S. (2d) 642 (1953).
Desmond, J., wrote a concurring opinion. Froesel, J., wrote a dissenting opinion
concurred in by Dye, J.
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which arose as an offshoot to a spectacular but sordid prosecution for
compulsory prostitution,4 took the form of a proceeding by newspaper
interests to restrain a trial judge from carrying out an order intended to
exclude all persons except such as had legitimate business in the court-
room.5 The attempted restraint was rejected, and the New York Court of
Appeals affirmed, when it held that a state statute which declared that
court sittings "shall be public . .. and every citizen may freely attend
the same '"6 did not confer any special privilege on the press. As a con-
sequence, it was held that it would be proper to exclude the working
members of the press from a criminal trial provided the general public
was also properly excluded.
By contrast, in the Ohio case of E. W. Scripps Company v. Fulton,
7
the relator, a newspaper publisher, was held entitled to have a writ of
prohibition against the order of a trial judge which was designed to ex-
clude all members of the public, including the press, from the trial of a
defendant accused of pandering, even though the defendant had given
a written waiver of the right to a public trial and had expressed the
belief that more effective cross-examination of certain witnesses would be
possible at a private hearing. Despite this, the somewhat related Ohio
Supreme Court case of State v. Cliffordg upheld a conviction of an editor,
a reporter and a newspaper photographer for contempt in disturbing
certain arraignment proceedings by the taking of a flashlight photograph
while the court was in session, an act done in deliberate violation of a
court rule on the point.9 The conviction was sustained when the court
found that, while the case did not involve any attempt to exclude the
4 See the companion case of People v. Jelke, 308 N. Y. 56, 123 N. E. (2d) 769
(1954), affirming 284 App. Div. 211, 130 N. Y. S. (2d) 662 (1954). Desmond, J.,
wrote a dissenting opinion which was concurred in by Conway, J. The court there
held that, except as specifically limited by statute, it was for the defendant, and not
the trial judge, to determine whether the criminal trial should be closed to the
public.
5 The judge, over objection, had excluded the general public, including the press,
but did allow the defendant to have present "any friends or relatives" he deemed
necessary for the protection of his interests.
6 N. Y. Cons. Laws, Judiciary Law, § 4. See also Code of Crim. Pro., § 8, and
Civil Rights Law, § 12. It should be noted that the New York Constitution is silent
on the point, but the statutes referred to have been held to be no more than a
declaration of the common law on the point.
7- Ohio App. -, 125 N. E. (2d) 896 (1955). Hurd, J., wrote a concurring
opinion. Contra: Commonwealth v. Blondin, 324 Mass. 564, 87 N. E. (2d) 455
(1949).
8 162 Ohio St. 370, 123 N. E. (2d) 8 (1954), affirming 97 Ohio App. 1, 118 N. E.
(2d) 853 (1954).
9 While no formal court rule on the point had been enacted, the trial judge, by
reason of the nature of the pending criminal proceeding, had reason to suspect that
the press would be on hand so he gave specific instruction on the point in advance
of the court session. This was held, at least as to those who had full knowledge,
to be the equivalent of a formal rule or other properly journalized order.
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press, it was proper to limit the conduct and actions of newspapermen in
the interest of the maintenance of proper courtroom decorum as well as
to insure a fair trial.
While the guarantee of the right to a public trial as expressed in the
United States Constitution 0 does not apply to criminal proceedings
conducted in state courts," the respective states have, either by constitu-
tional provision or by legislative enactment, granted to their citizens the
protection afforded by a public trial.1 2  As is true of other constitutional
guarantees, however, both in federal and state courts, the accused generally
has the privilege of waiving this right to a public trial if he should so
desire, 13 hence it is not required that all criminal proceedings must be
public, but rather that a public trial is necessary only in those cases
wherein the accused so desires.'
4
In the event a public trial is so desired, an issue might then be
reached as to just what constitutes a "public" trial and how far the
courts may go in excluding some of those who constitute the public, which
problem has long troubled the judiciary. Even today, there is a split of
authority on this matter with the New York court which, up until a short
time ago, allowed the presiding judge, in his discretion, to exclude certain
classes of the public from criminal trials,15 now holding that attendance
by a limited class of persons would not satisfy the legislative mandate
despite the fact the case was one of an obscene, indecent, or revolting
nature.16 Other states follow this rule in substance but deviate from it
to the extent that minors may be excluded from trials where lurid and
obscene acts will be in question. 1 7  It is certain, however, that the power
of the trial judge is such that he may regulate the proceedings of the
trial in order to assure security and orderly progress.' 8
Considering the problem for a moment solely as a matter of concern
to a defendant in a criminal case, there is evident reason why such a
person would generally want a public trial for the open examination of
the witnesses "viva voce" in the presence of all mankind is much more
10 U. S. Const., Amend. VI.
11 Falkowski v. May, 173 F. (2d) 742 (1949). See also Baker v. Utecht, 161 F.
(2d) 304 (1947).
12 A list of these provisions appears in a note in 49 Col. L. Rev. 110, note 2.
13 United States v. Sorrentino, 175 F. (2d) 721 (1949).
14 The extent to which these constitutional rights are personal to the defendant
may be noted in the recent Illinois case of People v. Spegal, 5 Iii. (2d) 211, 125
N. E. (2d) 468 (1955), which deals with a defendant's right to waive trial by jury.
15 People v. Hall, 51 App. Div. 57, 64 N. Y. S. 433 (1900).
16 People v. Jelke, 308 N. Y. 56, 123 N. E. (2d) 769 (1954).
17 State v. Hensley, 75 Ohio St. 255, 79 N. E. 462, 9 L. R. A. (N. S.) 277, 116 Am.
St. Rep. 734 (1906).
'8 People v. Byrnes, 84 Cal. App. (2d) 64, 190 P. (2d) 290 (1948).
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conducive to the clearing up of truth than any "private and secret
examination taken down before an officer or his clerk in the ecclesiastical
courts and all others that have borrowed their practice from the civil
law, where a witness may frequently depose that in private which he
will be ashamed to testify in a public and solemn tribunal. "19 When the
defendant elects a public trial, therefore, under the English rule as laid
down in the case of Daubney v. Cooper,20 he must realize that the pro-
ceedings of the court are to be public to the extent that all parties who
desire to witness the proceedings have a right to do so, provided there
is room, provided they do not disturb the trial, and provided there is no
specific reason why they should not be there.
The press representatives, as members of the public, would also have
a right to be present but they must be guarded as to what they report in
print for it has been said that if an English newspaper were to "publish
an unfair and misleading account of committal proceedings, or give dam-
aging information about an accused person, there is always the chance
that the court will regard it as contempt. "21 Although efforts to induce
the English Home Secretary to introduce legislation designed to restrict
newspaper reports of cases were turned down on the theory the power to
punish for contempt of court was sufficient,22 other English-speaking
jurisdictions have enacted legislation to deal with the matter.
23
So far as courts in the United States are concerned, it cannot be
said that there is any uniform rule followed throughout the states. Some
jurisdictions hold to the view that all reasonable rules for the orderly,
speedy and effective conduct of the court's duties should be upheld,24 with
the consequent addition that the constitutional right of a party to have
a case tried fairly before an impartial tribunal carries with it the thought
that the trial should not be influenced by newspaper dictation or popular
clamor.25  The strongest expression of this view is to be found in the
19 BI. Comm., III, 373.
20 10 B. & C. 237, 109 Eng. Rep. 438 (1829).
21 Jackson, The Machinery of Justice in England (Cambridge University Press,
1953), 2d Ed., p. 131. The author notes that, "in March 1949, the editor of the Daily
Mirror was committed to prison for three months and the newspaper company
ordered to pay a fine of £10,000 and costs for contempt of court in publishing
material about a man who had been charged with murder."
22 Ibid., p. 131.
23 Manitoba, Rev. Stat. 1913, c. 46, § 50, indicates that the public or any particular
class of the public may be excluded from the trial in the interest of public morals.
New Brunswick Rev. Stat. 1927, c. 129, § 18c, directs that filiation proceedings are
not to be held In open court. Under Newfoundland Stat. 1930, c. 14, § 38, the com-
mitting magistrate may direct that "no person shall have access" if he deem it best.
24 People v. Kerrigan, 73 Cal. 222, 14 P. 849 (1887). See also People v. Swafford,
65 Cal. 223, 3 P. 809 (1884), to the effect that the word "public" does not mean that
every person who sees fit shall, In all cases, be permitted to attend criminal trials.
25 In re Hughes, 8 N. M. 225, 43 P. 692 (1895).
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Maryland case entitled Ex parte Sturm
2 where the court said that the
right of the accused to a public trial was for his benefit and that this right
did not entitle the press or the public to take advantage of his predicament
or to photograph him during his confinement. The court there also noted
that where the right of freedom of the press was invoked in support of
acts which constituted an invasion of that domain wherein the court's
authority was exclusive then, after giving due regard to both the press
and the court, any encroachment under the guise of freedom of the press
could not be sanctioned.
Other jurisdictions take a "middle of the road" attitude, holding
fast to the principle of the freedom of the press while at the same time
stating that the motive for coverage and publication of material should be
looked into, so that matter published for the public good 27 should be dis-
tinguished from the publication of unwholesome matter. 28 But an ex-
treme view in favor of the press may be noted in the North Carolina case
of Cowan v. Fairbrother29 where it was said that freedom of the press
included not only exemption from censorship but also security against
legislation as well as measures resorted to by other branches of the gov-
ernment for the purpose of stifling just criticism or the muzzling of public
opinion. This view, to some extent, has been followed by the Supreme
Court of Ohio for it has said that the people have a right to know what
is being done in their courts, provided the free observation and discussion
concerning the proceedings of public tribunals was consistent with the truth
and written with an eye toward decency.30  In that connection, the most
recent Ohio case on the point has stated that "public morals are not pro-
tected by trying to hide its sins behind closed doors. Better that we know
our faults that we may ever increase our efforts to live in social recti-
tude. "31 To that thesis, a concurring judge added that it was his opinion
that "crime and corruption grow and thrive in darkness and secrecy.
Justice thrives in the open sunlight of day."32
26 152 Md. 114, 136 A. 312, 51 A. L. R. 356 (1927).
27 State v. Shepherd, 177 Mo. 205, 76 S. W. 79, 99 Am. St. Rep. 624 (1903).
28 State v. Pioneer Press Co., 100 Minn. 193, 110 N. W. 867, 117 Am. St. Rep. 684.
9 L. R. A. (N. S.) 480 (1907).
29 118 N. C. 406, 24 S. E. 212, 32 L. R. A. 829 (1896).
30 State v. Hensley, 75 Ohio St. 255, 79 N. E. 462, 9 L. I. A. (N. S.) 277 (1906).
The case of State v. Keeler, 52 Mont. 205, 156 P. 1080 (1916), also notes that the
doors of the court room must be open during all the sittings of the court and the
power does not exist anywhere to exclude anyone sul jiuris who comes into the
presence of the court when there is accommodation for him so long as he conducts
himself in a becoming manner.
31 - Ohio App. -, 125 N. E. (2d) 896 at 904.
32- Ohio App.-, 125 N. E. (2d) 896 at 909.
NOTES AND COMMENTS 343
Somewhere, in this maze of conflict, lies an ordinance of reason
which, if promulgated properly, could redound to the common good. To
discover this ordinance will be no easy task but, if the rights of all the
parties are to be fairly considered, a just rule must be laid down. The
issues, constitutional and otherwise, are too important to any free race
of people to permit of their settlement by default or as the result of any
organized pressure built up by one group or another to advance their own
ends. The highest forms of American ingenuity are needed and must
be called into play if the wisest solution is to be produced. Anything less
would be both insufficient and dangerous.
J. J. MULDOON.
